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CHAPTER Ill 
DUTCH COUNTERTERRORISM: AN 
EXCEPTIONAL BODY OF LEGISLATION OR 
JUST AN INEVITABLE PRODUCT OF THE 
CULTURE OF CONTROL? 
MAARTJE V AN DER WOUDEI 
'A state which has security as its sole task and source of le-
gitimacy is a fragile organism; it can always be provoked by 
terrorism to become itselfterroristic' 2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past decade, criminological research on risk-
management, actuarial justice, pre-emption, prevention and the 
governance of security risks such as organized crime and terror-
ism has expanded enormously.' While drawing on various theo-
retical frameworks in order to analyze and explain different 
developments and new phenomena, the legal-philosophical 
theory of the 'state of exception' as formulated by Car! Schmitt' 
1 Dr. M.A.H. van der Woude, LLM is assistant professor at the Institute for 
Criminal Law & Criminology, Leiden University. 
2 Agamben, G. (2001) 'On Security and Terror', Frankfurter Allgemeine 
/eitung 20 September 2001. 
3 This development is also noted and analyzed by Ardau. See: Ardau, C. and 
Van Munster, R. (2009) 'Exceptionalism and the War on Terror: Criminology 
meets International Relations', British Journal of Criminology, 49, pp. 686-
701. 
4 
Schmitt, C. (1996) The Concept of the Political by Tracy B. Strong. Chi-
cago: University of Chicago Press. 
A. Ellian, G. Molier (eds.), The State of Exception and Militant Democracy in a Time of 
Terror, 69-95. 
·f} 2012 Republic of Letters Publishing. All rights reserved 
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and reformulated by Giorgio Agamben5, has found little reso-
nance. Whereas the theory could especially provide valuable 
insights for criminological studies focusing on 'the war on ter-
ror', even there it has not attracted much attention.' While the 
rise of security governance has propelled some discussions 
about mechanisms 'for determining under what conditions and 
in what degree derogation [from rights] is permissible'' , the 
state of exception is largely absent from such discussions. In-
stead, counter-terrorism legislation and policies post-9/11 have 
been mostly explored through the criminological and sociologi-
cal lens and vocabulary of state crime, moral panic or govern-
mentality.' 
In a modest attempt to build theoretical bridges, this article 
combines the criminological perspective of the development of 
a culture of control, as described by David Garland in The Cul-
ture of ControP, with Schmitt's and Agamben's legal philoso-
phical notions on the state of exception as a non-localizable 
foundation of a political order. The goal is to provide a critical 
analysis and discussion of the Dutch post-9111 counterterrorism 
legislation. With the term culture of control Garland refers to 
the development of a society which revolves around mitigating 
various safety and security risks by all means possible: besides 
expanding the scope of the criminal law, administrative meas-
ures as well as technological measures and new forms of inter-
5 Agamben, G. (1998) Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans~ 
lated by Daniel Heller~Roazen. Stanford: Stanford University Press; Agam-
ben, G. (2004) State of Exception, translated by Kevin Attell. Chicago: Chi-
cago University Press. 
6 Welch, M. (2007) 'Sovereign Impunity in America's War on Terror: Exam-
ining Reconftgured Power and the Abscence of Accountability', Crime, Law 
and Social Change, 47, pp. 135-150; Ericson, R.V. (2007) Crime in an Inse-
cure World, London: Polity Press. 
7 Zedner, L. (2005) 'Securing Liberty in the Face of Terror: Reflections from 
Criminal Justice', Journal of Law & Society, 32, p. 521. 
8 Ardau, C. and Van Munster, R. (2009) 'Exceptionalism ani:i the War on 
Terror: Criminology meets International Relations', British Journal ofCrimi- V' 
nology, 49, p. 687. 
9 Garland, D. (2001) The Culture of Control. Crime and Social brder in Con-
temporary Society, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1 
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vention are implemented in order to widen the net of soc.ial 
control as much as possible." As will be further discussed in the 
article, the theoretical framework of the culture of control helps 
to better understand the 'origin' as well as the persistency and 
the impact of state of exception, not only with regard to coUIJ-
terterrorism policy but with regard to all legislation in the field 
of public order and safety. 
After a description of the most important aspects of the cul-
ture of control thesis (§2), Garland and Agamben will be 
brought together (§3), by showing where their theoretical re-
flections on the government's response to terrorism - and crime 
in general - meet and complement each other. In the next para-
graph (§4) some key results of an ·extensive case study into the 
drafting of Dutch counterterrorism legislation will be presented, 
providing an important yet worrisome insight into the political 
rhetoric and the decision-making process underlying this body 
of legislation as well as some of the 'exceptional' choices that 
have been made along the way. The article will conclude (§5) 
with a critical reflection upon the question what the emergence 
of a culture of control and the state of exception that it institu-
tionalizes implies for the way the Dutch formal legislative pro-
cedure is currently organized. 
2. THE CULTURE OF CONTROL AND THE STATE OF EXCEPTION 
The term culture of control was coined and introduced by 
David Garland in 2001 with his eponymous book. Garland's 
analysis is intended as an explanation for a radical change in 
(ideas on) the approach to crime." A multiplicity of develop-
10 In his work, Garland builds further upon the theoretical insights as pre-
sented by Michel Foucault in his Discipline & Punish as well as by-Stanley 
Cohen's "The punitive city: notes on the dispersal of social control". Foucault, 
Michel (1975). Disciplbie and Punish: the Birth of the Prison, New York: 
Random House; Cohen, S. (I 979) "The punitive city: notes on the dispersal of 
social control", Contemporary Crises, 3( 4), pp. 341-363. 
11 Garland obServes 12 indices of changes within crime control since the 
seventies that typify the culture of control: the decline of the rehabilitative 
ideal, the re-emergence of punitive sanctions and expressive justice, changes 
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ments have contributed to the fact that the focus of criminal 
justice and criminal Jaw is no longer the resocialization of indi-
viduals demonstrating deviant behaviour, but rather the protec-
tion of the majority in society who does behave in line with the 
Jaw. Most of the attention is now paid to controlling crime and 
the risks of crime. The use of criminal law as an instrument to 
control safety risks has become part of an all encompassing 
culture of control. Garland is set to explain this movement from 
penal welfarism which characterized most of the twentieth cen-
tury with its emphasis on resocialization, correctionalism and 
reform, to what he terms the 'crime control complex', the cul-
ture of control which has emerged in the last thirty years. To do 
this, he points to two major transformative forces: firstly the 
social, economic and cultural changes associated with late mod-
ernity which became most pronounced from the seventies on-
wards and secondly the changes within the political and policy 
context. Before discussing both sets of transformative forces 
· more in detail it should be mentioned that although Garland's 
analysis focuses on the United States and the United Kingdom, 
various research has shown that his analysis is equally applica-
ble to the Netherlands." After their extensive and in-depth 
analysis of penal developments in the Netherlands, Downes and 
Van Swaaningen for instance reach the following conclusion: 
"Despite all the differences in time, size and intensity, the 
Netherlands is following much the same lines as David Garland 
in the emotional tone of crime policy, the return of the victim, above all: the 
public must be protected, politicization and the new populism, the reinvention 
of the prison, the transformation of criminological thought, the expanding 
infrastructure of crime prevention and community safety, civil society and the 
commercialization of crime control, new management styles and working 
practices, a perceptual sense of crisis. Garland 200 I, pp. 6-20. 
12 See for instance: Pakes, F. (2004) 'The politics of discontent: The Emer-
gence of a New Criminal Justice Discourse in the Netherlands', The Howard 
Journal, pp. 284-298_; Pieterman, R. (2008) De voorzorgcu/tuur: streven naar 
veiligheid in een wereld vol risico en onzekerheid, Den Haag: Boom Juridi- _-, 
sche uitgevers; Swaaningen, R. van (2004) 'Veiligheid in Nederland en Euro- V 
pa; een sociologische beschouwing aan de hand van David Garland', Justlti€/e 
Verkenningen,?, pp. 9-23; Van der Woude, M.A.l-1. (2010) Wetgeving in eJn 
Vei/igh~idscu!tuur, Den Haag: Boom Juridische Uitgevers. 1 
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(2001) analyzes in his Culture of Control for the United State 
and England. If we follow Garland's analysis and consider pun-
ishment to be a cultural agent, the current message is that the 
Dutch have purged themselves of the misplaced leniency of the 
past and are no longer afraid to punish"D 
Radical changes in late-modern society 
In order to fully grasp the impact of the culture of control, it is 
important to understand that the new field of crime control and 
criminal justice was shaped not by the programs of reformers or 
by criminological ideas but by the character of late twentieth-
century society, its problems, its culture and its technologies of 
power."' According to Garland, the social, economic and cul-
tural changes associated with late modernity are the root cause 
for the changes within the field of crime control and criminal 
justice policy that have become visible since the mid-seventies. 
The postwar period was marked by dramatic changes in several 
areas: Garland charts the emergence of youth culture, the im-
pact of electronic media, the rise of spatial mobility, individual-
ism, a new hedonism of instant gratification -and behind all of 
these and, most importantly, the restructuring of the labor mar-
ket and the changes in the family and the household. These 
changes in turn had a profound impact on the institutions of the 
welfare state as well as on the organization of crime prevention 
and social control. The irony is that the welfare state, once very 
successful in solving various social problems and one of the 
driving forces behind the formation of late modern society, was · 
now seen increasingly problematic and 'risky'."' Besides bring-
13 Downes, D. en Swaaningen, R. van (2007) The Road to Dystopia; changes 
in the penal climate in the Netherlands, in: M. Tonry & C. Bijleveld (eds.) 
Crime and Justice in the Netherlands. Chicago: Chicago University Press, p 
66. 
"' Garland 200 I, p. 72. 
15 For this part of his theoretical reflection, Garland builds upon the work of 
Anthony Giddens and Ulrich Beck who describe the transformation of the 
welfare state into a culture of control. E.g. see: Beck, U. ( 1986) Risikogesell-
shaft: Auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne,' Frankfurt a. M: Suhrkamp; 
Beck, U. (1992) 'From industrial society to the risk society: questions of 
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ing wealth and progress to society, the welfare state now 
seemed to be 'producing' a problematic side-product in the 
form of crime." Both the relaxation of informal social and situ-
ational controls in all areas of life, the general increase in mate-
rial wealth and the presence of a large 'population at risk' -
teenage males with great affluence and mobility outside the 
disciplines of work and family and used to instant gratification 
- have led to an increase in the opp01tunity to commit crimes 
and to a more crime prone society in general. 17 Crime had be-
come yet another product of late modern society, a part of eve-
ryday lived reality. 
This notion of crime as a normal fact of life has lead to the 
formation of a distinctive culture that has grown up around 
crime - a culture that changes the conditions in which criminal 
_law and criminal justice policy operate. This cultural formation, 
which is referred to as the crime control complex of late moder-
nity, is characterized by a distinctive cluster of attitudes, beliefs 
and practices. High crime rates are regarded as a normal social 
fact and crime-avoidance becomes an organizing principle of 
everyday life. 18 Citizens become crime-conscious, attuned to the 
crime problem, and exhibit high levels of fear and anxiety. Fear 
survival, social structure and ecological enlightenment', Theory, Culture and 
Society, (I), pp. 97-123; Giddens, A. (1998) 'Risk Society: the context of 
British politics', in: J. Franklin (ed.) The Politics of Risk Society Oxford:· 
Polity Press in association with the Institute for Public Policy Research, pp. 
23-42; Giddens, A. (1999) 'Risk and Responsibility', Modern Law Review, 62 
(I), pp. 1-10. 
16 Garland 200 I, pp. 92-94. 
17 Garland, D. (2000) 'The Culture of High Crime Societies: Some precondi-
tions of recent 'law and order' policies. British Journal of Criminology, 40 
(3), pp. 347-375. In his book 'Liquid Modernity', Zygmunt Bauman also 
reflects upon the impact the changes brought by late modernity have had on 
(in)formal social bonds and (in)formal social controL With the term Liquid 
modernity Bauman describes the present condition of the world as contrasted 
with the 11 solid" modernity that preceded it. As Bauman states, this passage 
from 11SO!id'' to "liquid" modernity has created a new and unprecedented set-
4
.; 
ting for individual life pursuits, confronting individuals with a series of chal- '? 
lenges never before encountered. Bauman, Z. (2000), Liquid Modernity, Cam-
bridge: ·rolity Press. 1 
18 Garland 2001, p. 106. 
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of crime is sufficiently widespread to become a political refer-
ence point and crime issues are generally politicized and repre-
sented in emotive terms. 19 A high level of 'crime conscious-
ness' comes to be embedded in everyday social life and institu-
tionalized in the media, in popular culture and in the built envi-
ronment." As Garland states, citizens' engagement with crime 
and also crime prevention produces an ambivalent reaction. On 
the one hand a stoical adaptation that prompts new habits of 
avoidance and crime prevention routines. On the other hand, 
there is a measure of irritation, frustration and aggravation at 
the cumulative nuisance that crime represents for daily life. The 
trauma of powerlessness in the face of fear prompts the demand 
for action. The feeling that 'something must be done' and 
'someone must be blamed' increasingly finds representation 
and fuels political action, as will be discussed more in depth in 
the next paragraph. 
In the Netherlands, the first signs of the emergence of a crime 
control complex can be traced back to the mid eighties. Never-
theless, it was not until the beginning of the 21" century that the 
crime complex reached its full potential. Pakes points at 'three 
watershed events' that have contributed to the rapid develop-
ment of the crime complex at the turn of the millennium: the 
terrorist attacks in New York and Washington in 2001, the im-
pact of the short-lived yet stormy political career of populist 
politician Pim Fortuyn and the murder of cinematographer Theo 
van Gogh by a home grown fundamentalist Muslim in 2004.21 
The short time-frame in which these events occurred has sig-
nificantly contributed to the uprise of a social and political cli-
mate in which (in)security and public safety as the central 
themes of public and political concern are increasingly dis-
cussed in a populist tone. 22 
19 Garland 2001, p. 163. 
20 Altheide, D.L. (2003) 'Notes towards a politics of fear', Journal of Crime, 
Conflict and Medio, (I), pp. 37-54. 
21 Pakes, F. (2004) . 'The polilics of discontent: The Emergence of a New 
'Criminal Justice Discourse in the Netherlands', The Howard Journal of 
Crimina{ Justice 43 (3), pp. 284-298. 
22 The impact of these three watershed events has been also recognized by 
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Policy responses to the new predicament of late modernity 
So how did the social changes of late modernity come to im-
press themselves upon the field of crime control and criminal 
justice? According to Garland, the development of a crime com-
plex produces a series of psychological and social effects that 
exert an influence upon politics and policy.23 The effects and 
changes that have taken place within the political and policy 
context constitute the second set of transformative forces lead-
ing to the emergence of a culture of control. As described in the 
previous paragraph, the crime complex gave rise to a general 
feeling of anxiety but it also clearly indicated the limitations of 
the criminal justice state since crime rates as well as fear of 
crime kept rising despite the state's penal-welfarist based ef-
forts to control crime and provide law and order. Garland 
claims that this situation puts governments in a difficult posi-
tion, making them face a new criminological predicament: they 
had to find an acceptable solution to the unpleasant message 
that crime rates are and would remain high in open, complex 
late modern societies whereas the possibilities to effectively 
cope with crime are limited.24 To prevent a further decline in 
public trust in government, 'politicians and policymakers are 
forced to somehow respond to this new predicament, since re-
fraining from any action and therewith openly recognizing the 
government's limitations would result in disastrous political 
costs." The state's response to all this has been rather ambigu-
other authors, see for instance: Buruma, I. (2006) Murder in Amsterdam. 
Liberal Europe, Islam and the Limits of Tolerance, London: Penguin Books; 
Boer, M. den (2007) 'Wake~up call for the Lowlands: Dutch counterterrorism 
from a comparative perspective', Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 
20 (2), pp. 285-302. 
23 Garland, D. and Sparks, R. (2000) 'Criminology, Social Theory and the 
Challenge of Our Tim~s', British Journal of Criminology, 40, pp. 189~204. 
24 Garland 2001, p. 105. 
25 Garland 2001, pp. 109-111; Garland, D. (1996) 'The Limits of the Sover- , 
eign State: Strategies of Crime Control in Contemporary Society', British f 
Journal of Criminology, 36 (4), p. 499. For a discussion on how both politica\ 1 
strategies are visible within Dutch crime control see: Van Swaaningen, R. 
(2004) 'Veiligheid in Nederland en Europa; een sociologische beschouwing 1 
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ous. On the one hand there has been an attempt to face up to the 
predicament and develop pragmatic new strategies that are 
adapted to it. On the other hand there is a more politicized re-
sponse evading the new predicament altogether by either will-
fully denying it and reasserting the old myth of the sovereign 
state and its plenary power to punish or even by abandoning 
reasoned, instrumental action and retreating into an expressive 
mode that is concerned not so much with controlling crime as 
with expressing the anger and outrage that crime provokes.26 
Garland states that the denial and the expressive (also: acting 
out) policy responses are rooted in a politics of fear. 27 Politi-
cians and policy makers are tapping into public concern about 
crime by advocating harsher .and more expressive penalties, 
public protection, enhanced control, exclusion and more atten-
tion for crime victims.'" Whereas the underlying rationale for 
this dramatic change in political discourse can be found in the 
urge to regain the public's trust in the criminal justice system 
and therefore to prevent further public outrage, Sparks and Gar-
land argue that the electoral consequences of not taking a firm 
stance on crime and punishment are probably a better explana-
tion. From the point of view of politicians, crime and punish-
ment have become too important to leave to professionals and 
scholars, leading to a 'getting tough on crime' stance across the 
whole political spectrum." While conveniently ~sing the media, 
aan de hand van David Garland', Justitiele Verkenningen, 7, pp. 9-23. 
26 Garland 200 I, pp. I 09-110. 
27 On the relationship and interplay between crime and fear of crime see: Lee, 
M. (2007) Inventing fear of crime. Criminology and the politics of anxiety, 
Willan Publishing: Devon; Furedi, F. (2005) Politics of fear. Beyond Le.ft and 
Right, Continuum: London and also Vanderveen, G. (2006) Interpreting Fear, 
Crime, Risk and Unsafety, Boom Juridische Uitgevers: Den Haag. 
28 In his influential essay 'The Philosophy and Politics of Punishment and 
Sentencing' Tony Bottoms has referred to this as populist punitiveness: 'to 
convey the notion of politicians tapping into, and using for their own pur-
poses, what they believe to be the public's generally punitive stance'. (1995: 
p. 40) Bottoms, A. (1995), 'The Philosophy and Politics of Punishment and 
Sentencing'. In C. Clarkson and R. Morgan (eds.), The Politics of Sentencing 
Reform, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 17-49. 
29 Garland & Sparks 2000, p. 200. 
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politicians seize crime related incidents to reinforce and main-
tain the message that preventive and forceful measures are nec-
essary since 'danger is lurking everywhere'. In the culture of 
control and the politics of fear that it encompasses, the actual 
development of crime rates is no longer relevant. 
Actuarial crimina/law as an important trait of the legal context 
of the culture of control 
The pursuit of security and (subjective) safety has become 
the major objective as well as the justification for many new 
policies and legislation." Despite the fact that many scholars 
have noted the limited effectiveness of criminal law as a means 
to increase security, especially this field of law has been 
'awarded' an important role in this political pursuit, therewith 
contributing to the development of what is come to known as 
actuarial criminal justice. 31 Actuarial criminal justice refers to 
the development of a preventive criminal justice. Actuarial 
criminal law takes insecurity as the underlying value of security 
politics, operating on the base of permanent feelings of fear, 
anxiety and unease. Security discourses and policies in the cul-
ture of control, are increasingly dominated by the logic of risk 
management, a logic which calls for the management and gov-
30 Jonathan Simon has also referred to this trend as governing through crime, 
Simon, J. (2007) Governing through Crime: !-low the war on Crime Trans-
formed American Democracy and Created a Culture of Fear. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. Also see: Bosworth, M. and Guild, M. (2008) 'Governing 
Through Migration Control. Security and Citizenship in Britain', Bri!ish 
Journal of Criminology, 48 (6), pp: 703-719 and Hudson, B. (2003) Justice in 
the Risk Society. Challenging and Reaffirming Justice in Late Modernity, 
London: Sage. 
31 In this context Boutellier speaks of a 'criminal justice paradox'. Boutellier, 
H. (2005) De veiligheidsutopie: Hedendaags onbehagen en verlangen rond 
misdaad en straf, Den Haag: Boom Juridische uitgevers, p. 150~ 151, The term 
actuarial justice was coined by Malcolm Feeley and Jonathan Simon in vari~ 
ous publications discribing the development of a new penology. Feeley, M. dn ·-" 
Simon, J. (1992) 'The new penology: ·notes on the emerging strategy of cor~ If 
rections and its implications', Criminology, 30, 4, pp. 449A74; Peeley, M. ~n 
Simon J. (1994) 'Actuarial Justice: the Emerging New Criminal Law', in: D. 
Nelken (eds.) The Futures of Criminology, London: Sage, pp. 173~201. 1 
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ern1~ent of risky populations by means of (statistical) calcula-
tions and proactive management rather than through the reactive 
management of real events and threats." Actuarial criminal 
justice links coercive state actions to suspicion without the need 
for a charge, prosecution or conviction. It also includes meas-
ures that expand the remit of the criminal law to include activi-
ties or associations that are deemed to precede the actual sub-
stantive offence targeted for prevention. Clearly, the starting 
point of actuarial justice is prevention rather than the defense 
against the actual threat. This means that the use and desirabil-
ity of preventive action is placed in the foreground, also where 
it concerns criminal law. As Dutch legal scholars Borgers and 
Van Sliedregt justly note, this development is 'foreign' to the 
criminal law system in a certain sense.33 After all, criminal law 
proceeds from the standard model in which action is taken on 
the basis of harm that has already occurred. The background of 
this is both instrumental and based on the legal protection. On 
the one hand, the repressive approach is based partly on the 
presumption that people are rational actors and are therefore 
deterred by the threat of the penalty that can be imposed if they 
act in conflict with the rules. On the other hand, preventive 
action entails the risk that - in retrospect - people are wrong-
fully subjected to far-reaching measures. 34 Despite the problem-
atic nature of actuarial criminal law and the warnings and criti-
cisms as formulated against it by legal (and criminological) 
scholars, this does not seem to have affected its development in 
any way. Against the background of a further evolving culture 
of control, in the Netherlands actuarial criminal law has 'ex-
ploded' over the past decades. 35 
32 R. van Munster 'The war on Terrorism: When the exception becomes the 
rule", International Journal for the Semiotics of Law, 2004, pp. 141~153. 
33 Borgers, M. and Van Sliedregt, E. (2010) 'The precautionary principle and 
anti-terrorism legislation' Eras m us Law Review, 2 (2), pp. 172-173. 
34 Dershowitz, A.M. (2006) Preemption: A Knife That Cuts Both Ways, New 
York: W.W. Norton & Company, pp. 7 and 19. 
35 In his inaugural lecture, Borgers - besides the Dutch counterterrorism legis~ 
lation ~ sums up various examples of Dutch actuarial criminal law that have 
been introduced over the past couple of decades: the increase of broadly de-
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3. THE CONTAMINATED LEGISLATURE: WHERE AGAMBEN AND 
GARLAND MEET 
The State of Exception investigates the increase of power struc-
tures governments employ in supposed times of crisis. Within 
these times of crisis, Agamben refers to increased extension of 
power as states of exception, where questions of citizenship, 
civil liberties and individual rights can be diminished, super-
seded and rejected in the process of claiming this extension of 
power by a government. The state of exception invests one per-
son or a government with the power and voice of authority over 
others extended well beyond where the law has existed in the 
past. The development of actuarial justice as a common feature 
of the culture of control fits this description. Motivated by the 
objective to pursue absolute safety, governments spend great 
efforts in detecting criminal and risky behaviour in the earliest 
stage possible, even if this entails an infringement on certain 
civil liberties. Actuarial criminal justice is one of the means 
through which governments expand their grip on all possible 
human behaviour, including potentially risky or criminal behav-
iour. This expansion of the government's net of social control 
through actuarial justice in a culture of control is also accompa-
nied by a dispersal of discipline since crime control has been 
extended to local and non-governmental (private) agencies. 36 
Due to this extended capacity for influence and action the gov-
ernment in a culture of control clearly becomes more powerful 
than before: they are able to fully control all citizens and to 
fined criminal offenses, the introduction of criminal participaion, the crimi· 
nalization of preparatory acts and conspiracy, the erosion of the guilt· 
principle, the introduction of sanctions specifically targeted at preventing 
recidivism, the exponential growth of the imposition of life imprisonment, an 
increase of maximum sentences in order to stimulate the prevention of risky 
behavioyr, the lowering of the threshold to use investigative (criminal) powers 
and the greatly increased role of technology and the desire for gathering -1 
often privacy sensitive ~information in the criminal procedure. Borgers, M. 1.
1 
~· 
(2007) De Vlucht naar Voren, Den Haag: Boom Juridische Uitgevers. ' 
36 Cohen, S. (! 979) 'The punitive city: notes on the dispersal of social con~l 
trol', Contemporary Crises, 3(4), pp. 339~363; Cohen, S. (1985) Visions of 
Social Control, Cambridge: Polity Press. I 
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deciae who should be excluded from society or at least deprived 
from his or her civil liberties and rights for being a potential 
risk or threat. 31 Or, to speak in Agambens terms, to actively 
separate "political beings" (citizens) from "bare life" (bodies). 
The additional value and importance of combining the State 
of Exception with the Culture of Control lies in the fact that this 
combination offers a new perspective to analyze various impor-
tant legal transformations. The state of exception is no longer a 
strictly legal category, as it is in the constitutional sense of a 
'state of siege', yet it coincides with the emergence of a culture 
of control. The merging of the culture of control and the state 6f 
exception has profound consequences regarding the drafting of 
new legislation and policies within the field of criminal justice. 
Whereas Garland's thesis has shown that politicians and poli-
cymakers (have to) respond to the new criminological predica-
ment of late modern societies through different types of policies 
and laws, by focusing mainly on the outcome he does not ex-
plicitly address the way in which this new predicament has also 
affected the policy-making process itself. This dynamics is 
made clearer in Agamben's work. One of the basic problems 
of the state. of exception is in fact the continued intrusion of 
the executive power in the legislature." Agamben even argues 
that politics has "contaminated itself with law" in the state of 
exception.39 The political power over others acquired through 
the state of exception, places the government as all powerful, 
operating outside of the laws. During such times of extension of 
power, certain forms of knowledge are privileged and accepted 
as true and certain voices are heard as valued, while many oth-
ers are not. This political dynamics might negatively affect the 
37 Hudson, B. (2003) Justice in the Risk Society, London: Sage Publications; 
Kernshall, H.(2003) Understanding Risk in Criminal Justice, Berkshire: Open 
University Press; Garland, D. (1996) 'The Limits of the Sovereign State: 
Strategies of Crime Control in Contemporary Society', British Journal of 
Criminology, 35 (I), pp. 134-137. 
38 Giorgio Agamben, Eta/ d'Exception: Homo Sacer 11, /, Paris, Seuil, 2003, 
Psi ~ ~~p ://www. egs. ed u/facu lty I giorgi owagam ben/vi deos/the-statewo f-ex cep ti on-
der-ausnahmezustand/ (visited October 1st, 2011) 
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MAARTJE VAN DER WOUDE 
legislature and the legislative procedure in such a way that the 
outcome of the legislative procedure in a culture of control with 
regard to new criminal legislation becomes a foregone conclu-
sion. Instead of being the result of a process of carefully weigh-
ing and balancing various competing interests and values, new 
criminal legislation and crime policies are motivated solely by 
irrational fears, 'underbelly feelings' and.•incident-oriented po-
litical impetus in order to secure future electorate. In moving 
from a more abstract, theoretical, level towards a more practical 
level, the following paragraphs will illustrate this perceived 
'contamination' by focusing on the Dutch legislative procedure 
and, more specifically, the drafting of Dutch counterterrorism 
legislation. 
The legislative procedure and its safeguards 
The process of drafting criminal legislation, or any other type of 
legislation, is complicated. Although every description would 
entail a simplification of reality, at best, it can be seen as a 
compromise of a complex process during which (potentially 
conflicting) rationalities and corresponding interests and values 
are taken into consideration and weighed by the legislature.40 
An ongoing issue in criminal law, or even a dilemma, is to 
strike a balance between the interest of collective safety and the 
interest representing civil liberties and individual (human) 
40 Hirsch Ballin, E.M.H. (1989) Het grondrecht op vrijheid en de wet, Alphen 
aan den Rijn, pp. 58-60; Veerman, G.J. (2009) Over Wetgeving: principes, 
paradoxen en praktische beschouwingen, Den Haag: SDU, pp. 153-162. In his 
inaugural lecture, Snellen distinguishes four different rationalities: the politi-
cal rationality, the financial- economical rationality, the legal rationality and 
the technical/ social-scientific rationality. According to Snellen, an act is 
alsways a compromise between these rationalities.See: Snellen, Boeiend en 
geboeid, Alphen aan den Rijn: Samsoffi H.D, Tjeenk Willink 1987. Zie ook 
Van der Heijden & Noordam, De waarde van het sociaal recht. Over beginse-, 
!en van sociale rechtsvorming en hun werking, Preadviezen NJV 2001, De- " 
venter: W.E.J. ljeenk Willink 2001. Also see: Cleiren, C.P.M. (2003)'De 'f 
wetgever aan zet', in: Brants, Mevis, Prakken & Reijntjes (eds.), Op zoek naar 1 
grondslagen. Strafvordering 2001 ter discussie, Den Haag: Boom Juridische 
uitgevers, pp. 55-79. I 
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rights. 41 Whereas under some circumstances it can be legitimate 
and necessary to 'trade' some I iberty in order to gain more se-
curity, but also vice versa, the legislator's decisions on which 
interest has priority over the other clearly should be made well-
advised and motivated. In order to ensure that all interests and 
rationalities at stake are accounted for and deliberated, the 
Dutch legislative procedure is designed in such a way that dur-
ing various stages of the process of drafting, different actors are 
enabled to review a legislative proposal against the background 
of legitimacy, accountability, consistency, practicability, as well 
as its perceived effectiveness. Examples of these, so the speak, 
safeguards built in the legislative procedure are the consultation 
stage, the Council of State and perhaps most important the ple-
nary debate in the House of Representatives (the Parliament), 
also known as the co-legislator.42 Being part of the legislature, 
41 When referring to or discussing the task of the legislator and in particular 
the choices that have to be made between the various interests, the term "bal-
ancing" or "weighing" is often used. Although these terms are also used in 
this article, it has to be noted that these terms might give off a wrong idea and 
therefore have been discussed by various scholars. See for instance Zedner, L. 
(2005) 'Securing Liberty in the Face of Terror: Reflections from Criminal 
Justice', Journal of Law and Society, vol. 32, no. 4, p. 511 and Ashworth, A. 
(2002) Human Rights, Serious Crime and Criminal Procedure, London: 
Sweet & Maxwe\1, p. 30. 
42 Before legislative proposals are tabled as bills in Parliament elaborate con-
sultations are held enabling all kinds of semi-public boards consisting of 
experts or representatives of interest or political groups to critically reflect 
upon the proposal. Also, according to article 73 of the Dutch Constitution the 
Council of State needs to be consulted on drafts for Acts of Parliament and 
draft decrees of government. The Council of State makes comments on the 
draft and advises the government what to do. Upon the comments and advice 
of the Council of State, the department first responsible for the draft drafts a 
reaction which is, together with the comment of the Council discussed in the 
council of ministers. The council of ministers may then decide to table the bill 
{the new status of the draft or proposal) with Parliament, notably the House of 
Representatives. The bill is directed to a relevant Committee by the chair of 
the house and debated there. Members of the House of Representatives can 
table amendments. After the committee has concluded its scrutiny with a 
report the bill is debated in the plenary. For further information on the Dutch 
legislative procedure, see: Voermans, W. (2009) 'Legislative Processes, Insti-
tutions and Safeguards for Legislative Quality in the Netherlands', paper 
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the House of Representatives has a great responsibility with 
regard to monitoring the process of drafting new legislation and 
reflecting upon and choosing between all possibly conflicting 
interests and values while also keeping in mind the foundations 
of the Dutch constitutional state." Over the past couple of years, 
various scholars have questioned whether the Dutch Parliament 
is still capable to adequately fulfill this responsible.44 Reasons 
for concern were found in the fact that (members of) Parliament 
hardly put any effort in researching the necessity, proportional-
ity and possible negative side-effects of proposed legal meas-
ures and policies. Scholars also found the substantive Parlia-
mentary debates, especially concerning criminal legislation and 
the inherent dilemma between collective safety and civil liber-
ties, to be very unsatisfactory. The debates are often very ab-
stract, not paying much attention to the concrete and more prac-
tical implications of new legislation. Individual members of 
Parliament usually quickly settle for a simple oral promise by 
the responsible Minister that the - for instance - proposed new 
investigative powers are simply necessary but will be used re-
servedly.45 
These shortcomings with regard to the eo-legislative task of 
the Dutch Parliament seem mostly applicable to the drafting of 
new criminal law. According to Dutch Professor of Criminal 
Law Klip this can be explained by the fact that the current po-
presented in workshop on "Different Approaches to Legislative Drafting in 
the EU Member States" during SIGMA conference. For the complete paper 
see: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/58/5/445 77810. pdf 
43 Van Ommeren & Zijlstra (red.), De rechtsstaat als toetsingskader, Den 
Haag: Boom Juridische uitgevers 2003. 
44 Konijnenbe!t, 'Het par\ement als wetgever', in: Gegeven de Grondwet 
(CZW -bundel), Dcventer: Kluwer 1988, p. 184. 
45 De Jong & Kummeling, 'De teloorgang van de Tweede Kamer als mede-
wetgever', in: l3ovend'Eert e.a. (red.), De staat van wetgeving, Deventer: 
Kluwer 2009, pp. 67-98, Bovend'Eert & Kurnmeling, Het Nedf!rlandse Par-
lement, Deventer: Kluwer 2004 (tiende druk), p. 171 e.v., Bovend'Eert, 'Min-1 
der controleren, meer en beter wetgeven ', NJB 2004, atl. 16, pp. 824-831.
1 
'f 
Janse de Jonge, 'De rol van het parlement in het wetgevingsproces', in: Eij-
lander e.a. (red.), Wetgeven en de Maat van de tijd, Zwolle: W.E.J. ljeenkl 
Willink 1994, pp. 311-327. 
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litica( discourse with regard to crime and safety seems to be 
mostly focused on the seriousness of the offense. As a result, all 
other aspects that also should be taken into consideration during 
a Parliamentary debate on new criminal law are left out. 
"Criminal justice issues are used to hedge political and electoral 
risks. If something happens and the criminal law can be applied, 
the legislature cannot be accused of failure (in the sense that a 
criminal cannot be tried or punished for his offense)." 46 In other 
words, no one wants or dares to bury the burden of being re-
sponsible for a mesh in the criminal law. Therefore, instead of 
critically contemplating the necessity of new actuarial criminal 
provisions as a rational solution to a specific problem, politi-
cians are eager to express their shared concern about crime and 
other forms of social nuisance and to promise a legislative re-
sponse without having sufficient knowledge of facts. 47 Exam-
ples of criminal legislation that according to different scholars 
has been drafted and implemented without being critically de-
bated by the Parliament are the Maximum Sentence Reassess-
ing Act (Wet Herijking Strafmaxima), the Administrative 
Measures National Security Act (Wet Bestuurlijke maatregelen 
Nationale Veiligheid), the Temporary Restraining Order Act 
(Wet Tijdelijk Huisverbod) and, as will be discussed more in 
depth in the next paragraph, the Dutch counterterrorism legisla-
tion.48 
Clearly, the legislative procedure with regard to criminal leg-
islation has been greatly affected by the dynamics of the culture 
of control leading to a permanent state of exception when it 
comes to this type of legislation. Criminal law has become a 
powerful tool in the hands of the sovereign state and the motto 
seems to be that the net of social control needs to be tightened 
at all times and at all costs. Due to the politicization of crime 
46 Klip, A.H. (2010). Totaalstrafrecht, Delikt en Delinkwent, pp. 583-592. 
47 Brants, 'Risico's, schandalen en publiciteit. De nieuwswaarde van een 
falende overheid', PROCES 2008, p. 52. ; A. Pechtold, 'Risicoaversie in de 
politiek', PROCES2007, 6,pp. 227-230. 
48 De .long & Kummeling 2009, p. 80-91; Schuyt, P.M. (2007) 'Wetgeving in 
een dramademocratie', Sancties, 4, pp. 205-209. 
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and (in)security, even one of the most important safeguards of 
the legislative procedure, the plenary debate of proposals in the 
House .of Representatives, seems contaminated since no politi-
cal party, neither those who are in the government nor those 
who are part of the opposition dare to take a more penal welfa-
rist take on crime related issues. The political risks of being 
seen as "Soft on Crime" are just too big. 49 
4. DUTCH COUNTERTERRORISM LEGISLATION 
As stated in the previous sections, the institutionalization of a 
permanent state of exception in the culture of control affects not 
only the outcome of the legislative procedure in terms of actuar-
ial criminal justice, but also more profoundly, the legislative 
procedure itself. Whereas this is already the case with regard to 
'normal' crime risks and crime threats, this is most certainly the 
case when it comes to the so-called 'world risks'." World risks 
~re non-localizable, open-ended, uncontrollable risks which can 
have a devastating impact on all citizens. As Beck states, terror-
ism, especially the post-9/11 terrorism, is textbook example of a 
world risk."Terrorism entails a persistent feeling of insecurity 
that affects people more deeply than everyday crime and the 
risk of accidents and disasters. 52 Although The Culture ofCon-
'rol was written and published before the terrorist attacks on 
New York and Washington, Garland claims that his analyses 
l1as only gathered momentum after 9/11.53 In this paragraph I 
19 Simon 2007. 
;o Beck, U. (2002) 'The Terrorist Threat. World Risk Society Revisited', 
Theory, Culture and Society ( 4 )2002-19, p. 39. 
il U. Beck, 'The Terrorist Threat. World Risk Society Revisited', a.w., p. 39. 
1\lso see; Peek, L. en Sutton, J. (2003) 'An Exploratory Comparison of Disas-
:ers, Riots, and Terrorist Acts', Disasters, 27, pp. 319-335. 
;
2 Goldsmith, A. (2008) 'The Governance of Terror: Precautionary Logic and 
:::ounterterrorist Law Reform After September IIth', Law and Policy, Vol. 30, 
l, pp. 141-167. Also see: Mythen, G. & Walklate, S. (2006) 'Communicating ,, 
he terrorist risk: Harnessing a culture of fear?', Crime, Media, Cufture, 2, pp. ¥ 
123-142. 
iJ Garland, D. (2008) 'The Culture of Control after 9/11'. Preface to Ku!ter 
ier Kontrolle. Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, p. 3. 
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will first describe three important legislative 'highlights' of 
Dutch counterterrorism.54 After that, I will present some results 
of a recent extensive discourse analysis of the legislative proce-
dure underlying the various counterterrorism laws. This analy-
sis sheds an important light on the decisions that have been 
made by the legislature and demonstrates how the government's 
often ill-founded argument on the necessity of the new counter-
terrorism measures has not hindered its rather swift implemen-
tation. 55 
Dutch post 9/11 counterterrorism in a nutshell 
Shortly after the 9/11 attacks in the United States, the then 
Dutch government announced a comprehensive action plan 
against Terrorism: The Action Plan Counter-Terrorism and 
Security. 56 The plan contained a sizeable range of(inter)national 
measures for the intensification of the fight against terrorism. 
Besides a vast array of policy and institutional measures, also a 
wide range of legislative measures that criminalize terrorism at 
a preliminary stage, meaning before any harmful acts have 
taken place were taken. The first response to the new threat of 
terrorism is the Dutch Terrorism Act (Wet Terroristische Mis-
drijven)57, the consequence of the (binding) implementation the 
EU Framework Decision." As most Dutch counterterrorism 
legislation, the new law has been inserted as a separate category 
of crimes in the Criminal Code. The act criminalizes conspiring 
to commit terrorism, recruiting for "armed conflict"- thejihad 
- and participating in and cooperating in terrorist training 
54 Also see: Den Boer 2007. 
55 Van der Woude 2010. By means of a qualitative content analysis of, among 
other things, all available written governmental documentation on the various 
Dutch post 9/11 counterterrorism legislation such as proposals, parliamentary 
papers, reports, etc. Van der Woude has reconstructed the legislative proce-
dure in order to try to uncover the various interests and rationales in play and 
the motivation of the legislator to choose cef:{:ain interests and values over 
others. 
56 Parliamentary papers 112001/2002, 27 925, nr. 10. 
57 Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 2004, 290 and 373. 
58 Official Journal of the European Communities, L 164/3,22 June 2002. 
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camps. 59 Moreover, the Dutch Terrorism Act increased the se-
verity of sentences for certain common crimes committed with 
a terrorist purpose. By means of the Act Expanding the scope 
for Investigating and Prosecuting Terrorist Crimes (Wet Ver-
ruiming Opsporing en Vervolging Terroristische Misdrijven) 60 
the investigatory and prosecutorial powers were expanded by 
lowering the threshold that triggers special investigative pow-
ers: now, authorities may investigate or prosecute suspects if 
they have "indications" (of a terrorist crime) instead of a "rea-
sonable suspicion" as is required for ordinary, non terrorism 
crimes. Moreover, the Acts permits pre-trial detention for ter-
rorism charges on the basis of an "ordinary" suspicion instead 
of the more stringent requirement of "incriminating evidence" 
as is required for ordinary, non-terrorism crimes. The pre-trial 
detention can last until the start of the trial, subject to a maxi-
mum of 27 months. During that period, the accused and defense 
can be deni~d access to the files and may not be informed of the 
incriminating evidence against them. Thirdly, under the Pro-
tected Witnesses Act (Wet Afgeschermde Getuigen) 61 the Intel-
ligence provided by officers and special agencies, heard in a 
separate procedure by a special magistrate, can be used as evi-
dence in a criminal trial. 
It needs ~o explanation that Dutch counterterrorism legisla-
tion and especially the cumulative effect of all measures taken 
can be regarded as actuarial criminal law pur sang: the global 
nature of the terrorist threat amplifies the characteristics of ac-
tuarial justice. While referring to the movie Minority Report, 
McCulloch and Pickering state that counterterrorism advances a 
pre-crime logic aimed at pre-empting latent threats, 'Justice 
through the Chrystal Ball'. 62 
19 Parliamentary papers !12007-2008, 31 386 nr. 3, p. 5. 
'
0 Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 2006, 580. , 
'' Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 2006, 460. I I' 
;z McCulloch, J. and Pickering, S. (2009) 'Pre~crime and counterterrorism. 
Imagining future crime in 'the War on Terror', British Journal ofCriminol-
,gy, 49, pp. 628-645. 
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Dutch Counterterrorism: Exceptionally drqfted? 
As mentioned above, the Dutch Terrorism Act, the Act Expand-
ing the scope for Investigating and Prosecuting Terrorist Crimes 
and the Protected Witnesses Act are the actuarial 'highlights' of 
Dutch counterterrorism, introducing an extensive package of 
measures enabling law enforcement agencies to track down and 
respond to potential security risks in the earliest stage possible. 
The preventive nature of the measures, possibly combined with 
the fact that the Netherlands, despite a history of South Moluc-
can terrorism in the seventies, had never known counterterror-
ism legislation before, has led to significant discussions in vari-
ous forums. Both from within academia as from within the po-
litical forum, (parts of) the legislation has been questioned or 
even criticized. Whereas it would be interesting to extensively 
go into the criticism as it has been formulated by various legal 
scholars, it is sufficient to say that the overall tone was a tone of 
concern: concern for the fundamental principles underlying the 
criminal law, concern for the Rule of law and concern for civil 
liberties and human rights." Although since 9/11 dozens of 
articles have been written underpinning these critiques, the out-
come of the discourse analysis are rather discouraging for legal 
scholars since the articles do not seem to find their way to the 
legislature. Despite, or perhaps due to, the fact that input from 
within academia could offer an important counterbalance 
against populist politics with its biased focus in favor of collec-
tive safety, academic publications are rarely cited or referred to. 
There is one critique from within the academic forum that 
should be explicitly mentioned considering the central scope of 
this article. One of the main concerns of Dutch legal academics 
was that by integrating the counterterrorism measures in the 
regular Criminal Code and therewith integrating national secu-
rity and criminal justice, the threshold to use the 'special' COUil-
terterrorism powers outside the context of a terrorist threat 
63 The various criticisms have been collected and analyzed by Van der 
Woude, M.A.H.(2012) 'Tegen Dovenmansoren?', Rege!Maat,S, pp. xx-xx 
(forthcoming) 
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would get too low. That way, these exceptional measures 
threatened to become the norm, possibly with grave conse-
quences for peoples' civil liberties and civil rights. With most 
counterterrorism legislation implemented in the Criminal Code 
and Code of Criminal Procedure, clearly this critique has fallen 
on deaf ears64 Besides from within the academic forum, the 
various institutions functioning as the so-called safeguards dur-
ing the legislative procedure (the Council of State and the vari-
ous institutions that can be asked for consultation in the early 
stages of the procedure) have also been very critical towards the 
various counterterrorism proposals. These critiques often 
touched the essence of the proposals, questioning the necessity, 
legitimacy and the expected effectiveness. Nevertheless, these 
critiques are also poorly reflected in the parliamentary debates .. 
And, in the cases that they have been brought up by individual 
Members of Parliament, these - at first glance - critical Mem-
bers show themselves surprisingly quickly reassured by the 
Minister of Justice's standard motivation for all counterterror-' 
ism legislation that "the proposed measures and powers are 
necessary in view of the threat that international terrorism poses 
for the Dutch democratic society"." So much for the impact of 
the safeguards. It should be noted that with regard to the Terror-
ism Act and the Protected Witnesses Act some of the safe-
guards were knowingly circumvented. The Council of State has 
not been able to advise the legislature on the most important 
and far-reaching changes resulting from the Terrorism Act 
64 The government has chosen to implement the counterterrorism legislation in 
the regular criminal code. 
In trying to prevent the contamination of the regular criminal law by the ex- 1 
traordinary counterterrorism provisions and powers, the majority of these 1 
extraordinary powers is connected to a specific set of crimes, the terrorist 
crimes and the therefore necessary terrorist intent (article 83a Criminal Code). 
By creating this separate set of terrorist crimes within the context of the regu-
lar Criminal Code, these provisions and powers are bound by the Rule ofLaw. 1 
Nevertheless, whilst referring to the necessity of an efficient counterterrorism 
strategy, the legislator has also made changes to "regular" criminal provisions, 1 ~-
which also apply outside the context of (counter)terrorism and therefore po·l 
tentially affect all citizens, not only those with a terrorist intent. 
65 Van der Woude 2010, paragraph 4.7.6. 
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(criminalizing conspiracy to commit terrorism and recruiting for 
"armed conflict". With regard to the Protected Witnesses Act 
the Minister decided that because of the 'urgency of a matter' in 
was undesirable to waste time on consultation." 
Almost all proposals have been ratified and signed into law 
without too many alterations made to the original draft. Al-
though the conclusions of a report that was published in 2009 
by the Committee on the Evaluation of Antiterrorism Measures 
(also known as the Suyver Committee) seemed to confirm the 
image of a too hastily drafted and ill-motivated body of legisla-
tion, the report found little to none (political) resonance.67ln 
January 201 I, in response to the report of the Suyver Commit-
tee, the Ministry of Safety and Justice published an evaluation 
which was titled: Dutch Counterterrorism in the first decade of 
the 21st century.68 The evaluative study can be seen as a first 
unsuccessful attempt to meet the 22 recommendation of the 
Suyver Committee to integrally evaluate the counterterrorism 
measures: since the study was carried out by the Ministry of 
Safety and Justice itself not only the objectivity of the study is 
questionable, the lack of research methodology also contributes 
to the feeling that the study is not taken seriously. In any case, 
the study does not reflect the 22 recommendations of the Suy-
ver Committee with regard to the design and focus of an evalua-
tive study at all. 69 This only strengthens the perception that 
Dutch counterterrorism legislation is not the result of rational 
66 ParliamentarY Papers II 2002/03, 28 463, nr. 8, nr. 9, Parliamentary Papers 
11 2004/05, 29743, nr. 10 and Parliamentary Papers 11 2004/05, 29743, nr. 6). 
67 Cornmissie Evaluatie Antiterrorismemaatregelen, Naar een integrale evalu· 
alie van Antiterrorismemaatrege!en, Den Haag: SOU Uitgevers 2009 .. 
68 Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie, Antiterrorismemaatregelen in Neder· 
land in het eerste decennium van de 2/e eeuw, Den Haag: Staatsuitgeverij 
2011 
69 
. For a critical reflection upon the evaluative study by the Ministry of 
Safety and Justice see: Woude, M .A. H. van der (20 11) 'Is het Nederlandse 
terrorismebeleid echt zo degeli,ik vormgegeven? Een kritische beschouwing 
van recent uitgevoerd evaluatieonderzoek'. PROCES, Tijdschrift voor straf-
rechtsp/eging, 90 (3), pp. 125-141. 
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and balanced decision-making, but rather of pragmatism, politi- , 
cal pressure and even plain 'panic'. 
5. DISCUSSION 
Whereas Agam ben's State of Exception investigates how the 
suspension of laws within a state of emergency or crisis can 
become a prolonged state of being, this article has. shown that as 
a result of its emphasis of risk-control and prevention, the cul-
ture of control institutionalizes the state of exception as a per-
manent aspect of the global order. Following Van Munster, in 
it, "Sovereignty is constituted in a Schmittian sense as much as 
bare life is subjected to actuarial criminal justice which goes 
hand in hand with technological processes of risk identification, 
administration and assessment. The dispersal and expansion of 
surveillance society implies that heterogeneous factors and 
events such as place of birth, religion, travel records, reading 
records, visa applications and immigration all become part of a 
cybernetics of control in which risk information is intrinsic to 
all decisions made on these issues. Prevention then is not con-
cerned with the production of something good. Its aim is to 
repress anxiety and fear. It does not work towards some utopian 
goal, but is guided by the principle of apocalypse." 70 The cul-
ture of control is a catastrophic society. In it the exceptional 
condition has become the norm. 
It cannot be denied that this conclusion is rather depressive. 
Thinking back of Garland's thesis, the ground cause for the· 
current culture of control can be found in the great structural 
and cultural changes brought about by late modernity. Since 
these changes cannot be reversed and time will have to tell ' 
whether future cultural and structural changes will change the 
current social dynamics, it seems as if we are simply stuck with 
the culture of control and the state of exception. Garland, who 
warns his readers that "We face the possibility of being locked 1 
70 Munster, R. van (2004) 'The war on Terrorism: When the exception be~ I 
comes the rule', International Journal for the Semiotics of Law, 17, pp. 152~ 
153. I 
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into ''a new 'iron cage'" 71 , has been criticized for painting this 
dark and dystopian image of the development of society and the 
criminal justice system. Lucia Zedner for instance suggests that 
one of the dangers of the 'dystopian' elements of his account is 
that they may serve to reinforce the feeling that the changes 
described are not only happening, but that they are inevitable 
and therewith contributing to a sense of pessimism amongst 
scholars regarding the possibility of a future very different from 
the circumstances we find ourselves in right now." In a 
thought-provoking article on the limited impact of legal schol-
ars on the development of counterterrorism legislation in the 
United States, Magulies and Metcalf state that as scholars, we 
need to resist an impulse to nihilism as well as the tendency to 
throw up our hands in despair with the lament that nothing 
works and all is inevitable." In my opinion, the combination of 
The Culture of Control and The State of Exception offers possi-
bilities to at least ponder about how to break through this dysto-
pian spiral by focusing on the common denominator between 
both "histories of the present": the influence of the state and its 
political actors. 
Although Garland is less outspoken than Agamben when it 
comes to holding the state and its political actors accountable 
for the emerging culture of control, by recognizing the changes 
within the political and policy context as the second set oftrans-
formative forces fuelling the culture of control, he also endorses 
to the impact,.of politics. Since the radical changes of late mod: 
ernity cannot be made undone, it therefore seems fair to explore 
the possibilities for change focusing on the political forum, 
preferably within already existing structures or procedures such 
as the legislative procedure. The power of the state in times of 
terrorism, but also in general when faced with other - less se-
71 Garland 2001, p. 204.1 
72 Zedner, L. (2002) 'Dangers of Dystopias in Penal Theory. Review of D. 
Garland, The Culture of Control', Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 22 (2), pp. 
341-366. 
73 Margulies, J. and Metcalf, H. (2011) 'Terrorizing Academia', Journal of 
Legal Education, 60, p. 471. 
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1ere - security threats, must be one of restraint and control. At 
tll times the power of the state must be governed by a rule of 
nverse proportion: the broader the state's power the more 
;trictly the state must be restrained by law.74 As stated in this 
trticle, it is necessary for the legislature to effectuate such con-
rol, yet the legislature has become too contaminated by popu-
ist politics in order to do so. Hence it seems essential to try to 
·estructure the legislative procedure to improve the functioning 
lf already existing safeguards or to even build in new safe-
~uards. Although a full discussion of the various possibilities 
:ranscends the scope of this article, one could for instance think 
lf intensification of the existing consultation and advisory 
·ounds, but also of a mandatory ex-ante and ex-post cost-benefit , 
malysis carried out preferably by a non-political body. 75 An ex- ' 
mte assessment in which all (competing) interests at stake with 
:egard to a specific proposal are charted could then be used as 1 
:he starting point of the parliamentary debate. In addition to an 
lX-ante assessment, the legislature should have the obligation to 
motivate the choices that are made between conflicting inter-
lsts. These kinds of measures should prevent the possibility of a 
veiled decision-making process in which, consciously or. uncon-
>ciously, certain interests are not or hardly seriously taken into 
~onsideration. If the urgency of a matter stands in the way of an 
ex-ante assessment, there is always the possibility of an ex-post 
assessment. This type of assessment is meant to evaluate both 
the effectiveness as well as possible (negative or positive) side-
effects of the legislation. Based on the outcome, the legislature 
74 E. Van Sliedregt, 'Euopean Approaches to Fighting Terrorism', Duke Jour-
nal of Comparative & International Law (20) 2010, pp. 413-429. 
75 Santillo, D. en Johnston, P. (1999), "Is there a role for risk assessment in 
precautionary legislation?", Human and Ecological Risk Assessment, 5, pp. 
923-932. Also see: Klein Haarhuis, C. & Niemeijer, B. (2008) 'Wetten in 
werking. Over interventies, werking, effectiviteit en context', Recht en Werke-
/ijkheid, 29(2), pp. 29-31; Woude, M.A.l-1. van der (2010) "Voorzorgsstraf- ''I 
recht: zorgen voor inzichtelijke keuzes. Een eerste aanzet tot een ex post~ en 
ex ante~evaluatiemodel voor de wetgever". In: Hildebrant, M. & Pieterman, R. 
(Eds.) Zol·g om Voorzorg Den I-laag; Boom .luridische Uitgevers, pp.77~ 106. 
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can decide whether it is necessary and advisable to maintain, to 
change or even to repeallegislation. 76 
Criminal Law is a powerful tool in the hands of the sovereign 
state especially considering the ongoing development of a more 
preventive, actuarial, criminal law. Although some threats 
might require and justify an preventive response by the legisla-
ture, the current tendency seems to be that the general fear of 
crime and nuisance is too easily used as an excuse for more 
progressive criminal legislation interfering with everyday life of 
all citizens. Bearing in mind the opening quote by Agamben, in 
the culture of control the surge for security has become one of 
the most important tasks of the state as well as the source for 
legitimizing an ongoing dispersal and expansion of control. To 
end this disturbing development of society in which the excep-
tion has become the norm and which undermines the founda-
tions of the Dutch constitutional state, it is necessary to some-
how guard the legislature against populist politics. Or as 't Hart 
puts it: "A democratic constitutional state can only flourish on 
the premise of a certain reluctance of politics, of its willingness 
- not only in theory but also in daily practice -to be bound by 
the preconditions of the Rule of Law and therewith the willing-
ness to accept a limitation of its own abilities."77 
76 Feldman has proposed four criteria that should always be taken into account 
when determining the- legality of counterterrorism legislation and therefore 
could be incorporated in an ex~ante analysis; (i) there must be a clear neces-
sity for restrictive measures, (ii) restrictions must go·no further than required, 
(iii) measures must be controlled by law and (iv) law must be cast in such a 
way to make sure that interference with liberty is clearly and rationally related 
to the aim of protecting security. Feldman, D. (2006) 'Human Rights, Terror~ 
ism and Risk: The Roles of Politicians and Judges', 19 Public Law, pp. 364-
371. 
77 Hart, A. C. 't (200 I) Hi er gelden wetten, over strafrecht, openbaar ministerie 
en multiculturalisme, Deventer; Gouda Quint, p. 124. 
95 
il 
> I 
:~ 
" li 
I' ,, 
,[[ 
~~ 
,, 
'l 
;;; 
\.\ 
fi }j 
I I ~ ~ ~: ~ ~ 
1
1 
~ 
'11 ~ 
• ~ ~ 
» ,, 
~~ . ~ 
• ~ 
• 11' 
lj\ 
~ ~ ~ 
~ 
i,l 
~~ 
fj 
!-1 
n 
H ~~ (\\ $!, 

